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Annette Hübschle (AH): General, please tell us 
a little about yourself and what drives you. 
General Johan Jooste (JJ): During the later 
years of my military career, I played a key 
role in the transformation of the army. Many 
lessons were learnt. My main contribution 
to the rhino campaign is strategic thinking, 
strategy formulation and then the dynamic 
implementation at all levels, and considering the 
many facets of the problem. I also helped with 
the design of the anti-poaching toolbox and 
ensured that it is sustainable and value adding.
AH: What is the background to the current 
anti-poaching strategy in South Africa? 
JJ: In early 2013, after I had been in office 
for about two months, we realised that [rhino 
poaching] was a global, continental and 
regional problem, and that our role is almost 
like buying time for other measures further 
along the supply chain to make an impact.
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A multitude of measures, including regulatory changes, law enforcement measures and demand 
reduction campaigns, appear to have done little to stem the tide against organised environmental 
crimes. However, fewer rhinos were poached in South Africa’s signature national park, the Kruger 
National Park (KNP), in 2015 and 2016 than in the year before and a steady decline was evident 
at the time of the interview in June 2017. The KNP is home to the largest number of free roaming 
rhinos in the world. The park has been in the ‘eye of the storm’, losing close to 4 000 rhinos 
to poaching between 2006 and 2016. In 2012, the South African National Parks (SANParks) 
management formed a unit named Special Projects. The function of the project team was to 
develop and implement mitigation measures to deal with the drastic increase in wildlife crime and, 
in particular, rhino poaching in the KNP. Major General Johan Jooste (Ret) heads the unit. Critical 
voices have questioned the efficacy of the anti-poaching strategy, suggesting that park authorities 
are waging a ‘war on poaching’ with unintended long-term consequences for protected areas 
management and community relations.1  Scholars have argued that ‘green militarisation’ has led to 
an arms race between poachers and rangers and, moreover, that ‘green violence’ has led to the 
deployment of violent instruments and tactics in pursuit of the protection of nature, and ideas and 
aspirations related to nature conservation.2  
In May 2017 Annette Hübschle interviewed Major General Johan Jooste (Ret.) to explore his views 
on the successes and failures of the South African anti-poaching strategy. The pair also discussed 
whether claims of ‘green militarisation’ in South Africa’s protected areas were justified.  
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The things we do as law enforcers always 
take cognisance of the bigger picture. We 
must think big. I see community ownership [of 
conservation initiatives] and beneficiation in the 
form of business ventures with material gain as 
key to sustainable management. 
Law enforcement in environmental protection 
requires certain skills and techniques. We had 
to start small but act with urgency without 
being reckless or hurrying. One example [of 
an anti-poaching strategy] which we looked at 
was Mozambique. The Mozambique story is a 
success story. In 2013–14, 75% of poaching 
in Kruger came from Mozambique; it’s now 
under 30%. This is because we engaged with 
all parties over a long period and kept working 
at it. 
Apart from a professional ranger service with 
dedicated staff, another factor was the use 
of technology. We started with night vision 
goggles and moved onto more applied 
technologies with a friendly human/machine 
interface. We came to understand what 
technology could do for us. 
The practice in Africa for the past decade 
has been to convert ranger corps into anti-
poaching units. That’s a bold and profound 
but unavoidable decision. I wouldn’t like 
to call law enforcement a band aid but we 
understand that we will not [end poaching] 
with law enforcement alone. Such a victory is 
impossible. Although, it must be noted that our 
actions save many rhinos.
We wrote up the essence of our current 
national strategy in the first quarter of 
2013 and in it addressed the necessity of 
biodiversity management and factors beyond 
law enforcement’s control. We realised that 
we needed alliances, better information and 
integration of efforts to be effective. 
Our philosophy is ‘think big, start small, act 
now’. On this we built our strategy to ‘clear the 
park from the outside’. It’s like the layers of an 
onion, you start in the countries that consume 
wildlife products, you work the international 
networks. You go to local communities, in 
Mozambique for instance. As law enforcers 
you are not directly involved, you have to be 
indirectly involved and make yourself visible 
and make sure that the green uniform is not 
only seen to be the aggressor. 
AH: Could you explain the role of rangers in the 
park? Their functions seem to have changed 
from a conservation to a law enforcement role. 
How does this affect ranger management?
JJ: This relates to the perimeter of the 
park, also called ‘fortress conservation’; the 
so-called ‘war’; and other allegations and 
assumptions about what we do inside the 
park. First, when it comes to anti-poaching you 
look at your rangers, what will the impact be? 
You then look at your structure, which is para-
military – not military, but you must convey 
certain skills and techniques to all staff, and 
work as a multi-faceted unit in a structure. You 
determine how you will cooperate with your 
airwing, other forces, or intelligence agencies. 
How do you sustain this? It is expensive. Many 
people say anti-poaching takes money away 
from ‘proper’ conservation. But in terms of 
a value proposition: anti-poaching requires a 
multi-million rand input to protect a multi-billion 
dollar asset. 
Our ranger training at the SA Wildlife College, 
as in the private industry, has changed 
drastically. Apart from their conservation ethic 
and skills, rangers need to be able to enforce 
the law through extended static and mobile 
patrols, and unfortunately making contact 
with poachers. How do you protect yourself? 
You adapt your training and your equipment. 
It starts with carrying ability. You’re no longer 
driving around, you’re walking. You’re in the 
bush for up to a week, so you also need 
camping equipment. Then you’re always 
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carrying a rifle, night vision goggles, good 
binoculars, camera traps, and sensors, all to 
improve rangers’ situational awareness. You 
add to that the Cmore [real-time situational 
awareness] technology  – and you have 
rangers conduct operations applying the 
techniques and drills they were trained in, in a 
very specific way.3 
We have designed and developed this structure 
and its systems, and we try to write it up as 
we go. So when the anti-poaching unit recruits 
rangers, we make sure they understand the line 
of command and management [we use]. We’ve 
got money behind this and we train and equip 
them for the business of protecting rhinos. We 
also need to ensure we protect our rangers by 
training them to acquire certain skills, many of 
which are military skills. 
I am often asked how many rangers have been 
killed by poachers in the past 10 years and the 
answer is none. Apart from amazing grace, this 
is a result of discipline and training.
This approach has risks, such as cost and the 
unintended consequences to conservation. In 
the past only 10% of rangers’ work was law 
enforcement. Currently 10% is conservation 
and 90% law enforcement. This work never 
ends, day or night. These operations also have 
a human cost. Poachers also have families. 
We know that many or most are lured into 
poaching because they don’t have alternatives, 
and if you make it once as a poacher, it 
changes your life. Then maybe you go a 
second time because the chances of being 
detected in Kruger remain low, unfortunately. 
The second cost is to communities. 
Communities start living off the proceeds of 
illegal trade because that is what is there. 
That creates a small economy, which in a 
way criminalises part of your community. The 
community then doubts the ranger uniform, 
perhaps wondering, ‘What did you do to my 
brother who went poaching?’ The human cost 
is severe among rangers and their families. 
We had to launch concerted and sustained 
projects to look after the spiritual, social, 
psychological and physical welfare of rangers.
We manage five main risks. The biggest risk is 
a ranger down. Rangers can get killed. Once 
poachers have the horn they are especially 
aggressive. The second risk is of a ranger 
being convicted. What if the ranger had to 
shoot and there is a fatality? The police are 
called in immediately, a docket is opened 
and it is referred to the National Prosecuting 
Authority. So on the first risk – ranger down 
– all you can do is to discipline and train the 
rangers. On the second risk, we must have 
legal support and keep training rangers in the 
legal rules of engagement. We do that at every 
meeting, then twice a year we send a legal 
team through the park where rangers and the 
legal team role-play the rules of engagement. 
They drill it into them that you cannot take the 
law into your hands because it’s not nice to 
see a fatality, nobody likes that. And, by the 
way, we don’t support shoot to kill, it will not 
solve the problem. It will only demean and 
degrade who and what we are. 
The third risk is of a ranger becoming 
psychologically bankrupt, their thinking and 
behaviour deviating from the norm. We have 
a lovely project, ‘Project Embrace’, where 
we have a psychiatrist who comes to the 
park to work with the rangers. Then, after 
every incident or tough time we contract 
psychologists who provide counselling. We 
also apply extensive preventive measures with 
our honorary ranger volunteers, talking through 
the stress and worries they have. 
The fourth risk is of rangers being rejected by 
and alienated by from communities. You walk 
into a Shoprite near your home on a Saturday 
morning and you’re stared at, avoided or 
insulted. The only thing that we do there is to 
yet again emphasise rules of  engagement, to 
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make sure nobody can ever point a finger at you 
and suggest that you’ve abused or taken your 
authority outside the park. If anything needs 
doing outside the park, it can only be done by 
the police. Police must make the arrest. 
The last risk is a very strange one: ranger 
betrayed. We know there is corruption. It’s 
not a challenge that every ranger faces but it 
damages good people when they realise that 
their colleagues have betrayed them. For that 
we have a specific budget to fight corruption. 
We have instituted compulsory lie detector 
testing and continually investigate and act 
against the corrupt. Sadly last year, we arrested 
one of our senior people but we owe it to 
honest rangers to do so.  
AH: You said that Kruger is doing lie detector 
tests with rangers. Can you say a bit more 
about what you are doing to prevent staff 
members and rangers from joining poaching 
gangs or collaborating with them?
JJ: First, we deal with that in our road shows 
during which we visit all 22 ranger sections in 
the Kruger National Park. When we engage 
with our rangers, it’s on a very personal level. 
We even have a former official from correctional 
services ask, ‘Do you want to go to jail one 
day?’ There’s the carrot and then there is 
the stick. We do integrity testing, including 
lie detector tests. It took a while to formulate 
this so that it fits into the framework of labour 
relations. A ranger gets a personal letter if 
we detect deceptions, so they know they 
are the subject of an investigation. We have 
extra capacity to investigate those cases. It is 
incumbent upon us to arrest and bring to justice 
those that are involved in corruption. There are 
not many but it’s not good for morale. You don’t 
want an honest ranger to feel betrayed.
AH: You mentioned that 75% of poachers 
came from Mozambique in 2013–2014. 
These numbers have changed. Are we seeing 
geographic displacement, including poachers 
moving from Kruger to KwaZulu-Natal? Has 
the composition of poaching groups changed?
JJ: There is a displacement effect, and we 
are very cognisant of it. We are in constant 
cooperation with the conservation authority 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife in KwaZulu-Natal. It’s 
no use asking [management at] Kruger. Yes, 
Kruger is the eye of the storm. Some of the 
poachers from our side, the western side, 
are foreign nationals but not more than an 
estimated 25%. Most are poachers recruited 
from the 2 million or more people west of 
Kruger, who haven’t got a lot of economic 
options. There are between 5 000 and 
10 000 people involved in poaching out of a 
population of more than 2 million.
AH: Let’s tackle ‘green militarisation’. Several 
academics and policy researchers have 
suggested there is a burgeoning arms race 
between poachers and conservation officials. 
Are we fighting a ‘war against poachers’? Do 
you agree that militarisation is happening?
JJ: We are in the business of protecting all 
fauna, including megafauna, specifically rhino 
and elephant. The last of these species are 
in Africa, and the money involved in their 
protection is staggering. We have no option 
but to act now. 
It is a business of protection. To protect rhino 
and elephant you need the rangers and if you 
send rangers, you must protect them. In a 
way, we feel the accusation of militarisation 
is a betrayal of the thin green line. We did 
not ask for it. If militarised poaching ended 
tomorrow we would just revert back to 10% 
law enforcement, 90% conservation. 
I think ‘green militarisation’ is a loaded phrase. 
It is a necessary intervention which can be 
pursued with responsible rules of engagement. 
I don’t think it’s our preferred method, but I 
know of no conservation institution in Africa 
that did not have to go this way. The fact that 
65SA Crime QuArterly No. 60 • JuNe 2017
Kruger draws a lot of attention has to do 
with ‘the ex-general’ [me] that came there, 
although the [paramilitary] training started 
before my time. I was quoted early in my term, 
saying we would ‘take it to the poachers’ and 
we did. In the first four years we arrested over 
1 000 poachers and confiscated over 300 
weapons. So a lot of rhinos were lost on our 
watch and a lot were saved. 
Green militarisation, I think, despite the one-
sided criticism, it’s a reality. If there is any 
alternative, then one must consider it. You 
first go to your own forces, your police forces 
– but police in the bush, it’s not a good fit. 
The army is conventionally trained. It’s not a 
good match either. In Africa, these forces have 
other priorities – crime fighting and peace 
support operations. So now you’re back to 
the rangers. 
Partial privatisation is not unthinkable but 
we have not done anything about it. It’s a 
profound decision: it will be expensive but 
there are specialist technologies with which 
you can combat wildlife crime in your park. 
That will bring about ethical, moral and 
practical issues that have not been 
considered yet. 
We have also adapted our rhetoric to avoid 
saying it’s a ‘war on poaching’. We have 
toned down that rhetoric, it’s not helping 
public perceptions. One expects academics 
to read a little more broadly and to consider 
other utterances that people like me have 
made over the past four years. We accept 
that people out there talk about the so-called 
war and the negative dimensions of green 
militarisation. We understand that. All we can 
say is that we intervene as responsibly as we 
can, and only because we don’t see other 
options. I would really like somebody to show 
me one community or demand reduction 
project that will decrease poaching before 
2020. There are many laudable interventions 
currently being launched but I honestly don’t 
see how selling beads at the gate is going 
to make a difference. I just don’t see a 
project that will create alternatives here, or 
change behaviour in the Far East, in the next 
three years. 
When you look at the figures you wonder if it 
might be too late for the rhino of Kruger or for 
the whole rhino species. We are not fatalistic. 
The rhinos will not go extinct but one must 
understand the context. Yes, militarisation 
is certainly not the preferred option in the 
bigger scheme of things. But what must 
we do to make sure that it doesn’t last a 
day longer than it must? One would like a 
discourse on that, to say, ‘Let’s make sure 
that this necessary intervention doesn’t last 
another 20 or 30 years.’
AH: Some have suggested that the 
privatisation of anti-poaching will ensure that 
only skilled professionals undertake anti-
poaching operations, and that some in the 
ranger corps may lack the required skill set. 
There are examples elsewhere in the world, 
including Iraq and several African countries, 
where private military companies have been 
involved in conflicts on behalf of the state. 
Beyond legal, ethical and moral issues, does 
this proposal require consideration of 
human rights?
JJ: It smacks of mercenaries. Six months 
ago we took a firm stance. We, SANParks, 
the Game Rangers Association and the 
SA Wildlife College decided not to allow 
sponsored military people to train our rangers. 
If you have special skills worthy of sharing with 
our rangers, you go to the SA Wildlife College, 
where your skills are toned and changed 
to suit our curricula. We’ve seen instances 
elsewhere in Africa, and a few in South Africa, 
where the trainer means well – they were a 
staff sergeant or a captain with 10 years in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, which is fair – but don’t 
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train my ranger as a sniper, I don’t need 
snipers. Don’t try training them in combat so 
and so. We were about to accept such training 
because it was free but those trainers don’t 
understand our specific requirements. I don’t 
care how long you served in Iraq, can you help 
me with training? That is something we must 
guard against, it’s unnecessary overkill, killing 
a fly with a hammer, and it conveys the wrong 
ethic or approach. 
I fully agree that employing private rangers 
is an option but one must be very careful. If 
you do that, for how long? What about your 
rangers? Where would they fit? How would the 
command channel work? 
AH: An article in this special issue of South 
African Crime Quarterly suggests that South 
Africa should emulate Botswana’s ‘shoot-
to-kill’ approach. Our Constitution would not 
allow such a policy, nor is there data that 
shows that the ‘shoot-to-kill’ approach has 
brought down poaching. What is your stance 
on this? 
JJ: We have advocated over time for many 
interventions, like the ability to work closely 
with the parks in Mozambique, and we 
always found solutions that were acceptable. 
South Africans were angry, demanding three 
things. First, they said ‘drop the fence’ or 
‘fence them out’, to which we said ‘No, 
the fence must be on the other side of their 
conservation area’. Then there was the issue 
of ‘hot pursuits’ [of poachers fleeing into the 
Mozambique side of the park]. We don’t do 
that. If we do joint cross-border operations 
and a situation develops where we come 
closer to your boundary, I hand that operation 
over to you. It’s impractical, it’s not feasible, it’s 
not necessary for two South African rangers 
to penetrate a 100 km into Mozambique. 
Finally, we get the really emotional people who 
respond to the barbarity of poaching depicted 
in a photo, by saying ‘shoot them’. But we as 
law-abiding citizens have never given consent 
[to such acts], no matter how angry we were. 
There is no evidence to suggest that [killing 
poachers] would solve the problem. We have 
to enforce the law, we must be clear about 
that. Similarly, our community projects will not 
succeed if we don’t prove to our communities 
that we can maintain the law. 
I have never seen [an example] where [killing 
poachers] helps. It is misleading when one 
is protecting some rhinos very well to say it’s 
because of the ‘shoot to kill’ [approach]. 
AH:  There have been a lot of rumours about 
the anti-poaching approach. People claim that 
poaching statistics are doctored and questions 
have arisen as to why they are released at 
infrequent intervals two or three times a year.
JJ: The strategy was to release them 
quarterly, but you know our country is busy. 
So unfortunately, here and there, they have 
been late. What we saw four years ago was an 
emotional response generated by the media. 
You opened the paper and read about ‘another 
bad weekend at Kruger’ where somebody 
said, ‘another 10 killed’, which was true but 
ignored the fact that the previous week fewer 
were killed. So we are in favour of a structured, 
periodic report and think that if there’s a report 
once a quarter, it provides enough of a context 
and a picture. 
One thing I can confirm is that our stats are 
our stats. They come from us, and have never 
been sugar-coated, even in difficult times. 
Remember it took us three long years to 
stabilise the rhino poaching rate and now we’re 
driving it down. What we have achieved is 
success, not victory – but we will get there. 
AH: On the topic of stats, are rhino calves 
and unborn rhino embryos counted in the 
rhino stats?
JJ: We don’t count unborn rhinos but calves 
are counted. A lovely part of our strategy is 
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the biological management. The thinking 
five years ago was, ‘Guys, let nature take 
its course, we don’t want rhinos in the zoo.’ 
But with time we adapted. So we have set 
aside resources and support and work closely 
with rhino orphanages. Where we can, we 
evacuate calves to one of those and we are 
pleased with the work that they do. 
AH: You touched on the importance of 
communities. In my research I found that 
communities are crucial for conservation 
successes and anti-poaching strategies. Right 
now, a dead, poached rhino is worth more 
than a live one to people living on the edge 
of the parks. What is being done to include 
communities and incentivise local people to 
become involved with conservation? 
JJ: You’re touching the very essence of the 
challenge: how can it be that this thing is so 
valuable to one person and means nothing 
to the next person? The fact that SANParks 
now has a special division at Kruger, Peoples 
and Parks, to look at corporate responsibility, 
has led to some good initiatives. Every time 
a bus of schoolchildren visit, every time you 
see meetings with traditional authorities and 
municipalities, good communication takes 
place. Recent efforts to compensate people 
who have land claims, the quick response 
to human–wildlife conflict, the preference 
given to communities when it comes to 
procurement, are some examples. There are 
also projects funded by [the Department of] 
Public Works, through which a lot of youths 
are now trained and brought in for auxiliary 
tasks. Some of these projects touch on 
awareness raising, a bit of socio-economic 
investment where we work on roads and 
infrastructure, and on microprojects – people 
selling beads at the gate, for example. But 
beyond that the business spaces are not big 
enough to get a funder interested, and that 
is why many of these community projects 
have little impact. It’s not that we have not 
done enough but we are falling behind with 
real community beneficiation. You know it’s 
about money, saying to communities, ‘You 
cannot have any of these, you must not try to 
compete with rhino money.’ 
You have to provide alternatives. If you 
side with me, it’s for the long term and it’s 
honourable. It must be possible, but then you 
need business people involved, you’ve got to 
build that business space, take their hands, 
you need honest developers and a lead time 
of at least a year or two until the project is 
fully-fledged. Personally, that makes me a 
little bit despondent because I don’t see any 
of those. I was in our archives the other day 
and I saw that the same thing was said about 
20 years ago, but did not lead to anything.
AH: There are limits to what conservation 
authorities can do to uplift communities. 
Maybe this speaks to the bigger picture of 
the lack of service delivery to communities 
in rural South Africa. Especially in the south-
western parts around Kruger, where you 
don’t even have small communities, there 
are peri-urban neighbourhoods with several 
hundred thousand residents. The frequent 
service delivery protests are an indication 
that the socio-economic conditions of people 
living around Kruger are dismal and that 
people are angry. 
JJ: When I drew our plan up for 2020, I 
put up this macro-plan and I couldn’t find 
any indication that any of those community 
interventions have made an impact on rhino 
poaching. I know that’s a profound statement 
and it’s a personal statement, but dammit, 
where are we going? Why is it like this? As 
for law enforcement, we all wish that rhino 
poachers were gone so that we don’t have 
to live like we live. I was in Kruger yesterday; 
we’re asking impossible things of people. 
The stress and the emotional strain that this 
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so-called war causes are not things we should 
extend one day more than is necessary.
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